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CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS
CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS. Funding devices enacted whenever Congress is unable to pass one
or more of the thirtee n regular appropriations bills by
the start of a fiscal year· are known as continuing
resolutions. Continuing resolutions- when first passed
in 1876 and up to J 98 I-were noncontroversial interim
spending measures designed to keep the government
afloat until the enactment of the regular appropriations.
Since 1981, however, the use, scope, and size of these
measures have dramatically expanded. Today, continuing resolutions typically provide full-year funding for
many (and sometimes all) federa l operations and serve
as a vehicle for unrelated legislation.
Continuing resolutions are extraordinari ly controvers ial. Critics claim that this funding device disrupts
the balance of power both within Congress and between Co ngress and the White House. Specifically,
since continuing resolutions are not subject to the
House of Representatives rule prohibiting the attachment of substantive legislation to an appropriations
bill, appropriations committees gain power at the
expense of authorizing committees. House and Senate
appropriations committee members who negotiate the
final terms of the continuing resolution wield enormous power. In fiscal year 1988, for example, these
members negotiated a ban on smok ing on domestic
flights of two hours or less, a plan to allow states to raise
the speed limit on rural highways to sixty-five miles
per hour, an extension of the Clean Air Act, and a
limitation rider prohibiting the Federal Communications Commission from modifying its regulations limiting the co-ownership of a television station and a
newspaper in the same market.
Continuing resolutions a lso affect the President's
veto power and, with it, the executive's role in shaping
BUDGET POLICY. Critics of continuing resolutions argue
that this funding device substantially underm ines the
veto power [see VETO, REGUI.AR] . By lumpin g together
several (if not a ll) of the thirteen appropriations bills as
well as unrelated substantive legislation, critics perceive that Presidents will be reluctant to disrupt so
many programs (most of which they endorse) through
a single veto. Moreover, since a continuin g resolution
prevents the shutdown of the federal government by
providing necessary funding, critics view the costs of a
presidential veto as extraord in ari ly high . Defenders of
continuing resolutions, in contrast, argue that a President who is willing to use the veto power can help
define the content of a continuing resolution. For
example, in fiscal year 1988, President Ronald Reagan
used his veto threat to preserve funds for antiabortion
counseling [see ABORTION] as well as aid to the contra
"freedom fighters" in Nicaragua.

COOLIDGE, CALVIN
Continuing resolutions, a lthough maligned f~lr
more often than they are defended, are like ly to
remain a p e rmanent fixture on the budget landscape.
Only once in the 1980s did Congress enact all thirtee n
appropriations bills by the e nd of the fiscal year.
Indeed, more than one hundred continuing resolutions were e nacted from 1965 to 1990. The prevale n ce
of continuing r esolu tions is a by-product of many
interrelated ph e nome na, including the 1974 CONGRESSIONAL B UDGET ANI) I MPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT, the
GRAMM-RuDMAN-HOI.LlNGS ACTS, and policy conflicts between the White House and Congress. Whatever the ir
cau se, continuing resolution s dramatically affect both
the shape and content of fe d e ral budget d ecisionmaking.
[See also PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESS IONA L RELATIONS.]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Fishe r , Lou is. "The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Co ngress: Formal Rules and Inform al Practices." Catholic University
Law R eview 29 ( 1979): 5 1- 105.
Devins, Nea l. " Regulatio n of Governm e nt Agencies through Limitation Rid ers." Duke Law J ournal (1987) : 456-500.

NEAL DEVIN S

307

